Washington and Lee Law Professor Christopher Bruner spoke at a conferenced titled “Understanding the Modern Company,” hosted by the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at Queen Mary University of London. The event, co-sponsored with University College London on May 9, 2015, brought together “scholars from around the world to explore the nature and function of companies,” aiming to “develop a normative approach to understanding the modern company.” Professor Bruner presented a working paper titled “The Corporation’s Intrinsic Attributes” as part of a panel exploring comparative and historical perspectives on the modern corporate form.
Washington and Lee Law Professor Christopher Bruner presented his current book project on the role of small jurisdictions in cross-border corporate and financial services at the University of Washington School of Law on Thursday, April 16. Titled “Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial World,” the workshop was a part of UW’s Faculty Colloquium Series.
Washington and Lee Law Professor Christopher Bruner presented his current book project on the role of small jurisdictions in cross-border corporate and financial services at the National University of Singapore (NUS) on Thursday, February 12. Titled “Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial World,” the seminar was sponsored by the Centre for Banking & Finance Law, an initiative of the NUS Faculty of Law, where Professor Bruner pursued his research on Singapore’s financial center as a Visiting Scholar.
On Thursday, July 10 and Friday, July 11, 2014, Washington and Lee law professor Christopher Bruner spoke at the annual conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), “an international, inter-disciplinary organization with members in over 50 countries on five continents” representing disciplines including “economics, sociology, political science, management, psychology, law, history, and philosophy.”
On July 10, Professor Bruner discussed his recent book, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power (Cambridge University Press, 2013), in which he develops a new comparative theory of corporate governance in common-law countries. On July 11, he presented his working paper on the role of small jurisdictions in cross-border corporate and financial services, “Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial World.”
Read more about Professor Bruner’s scholarship here.
On Thursday, July 3, 2014, Washington and Lee law professor Christopher Bruner participated in a panel discussion at the Aspen Institute’s Ideas Festival. Held at the Aspen Institute’s campus in Aspen, Colorado and co-sponsored by The Atlantic, the Aspen Ideas Festival gathers “leaders from around the globe and across many disciplines to engage in deep and inquisitive discussion of the ideas and issues that both shape our lives and challenge our times.” The panel discussion, titled “Seeking Business Leaders for the 21st Century,” was organized by the Aspen Institute’s Business and Society Program.
In June 2014 Washington & Lee law professor Christopher Bruner contributed to The Conglomerate as a guest blogger. Professor Bruner’s four posts examine issues in corporate governance. His recently published book on the subject is titled Corporate Governance in the Common Law World.
Professor Bruner’s contributions include:
Shareholder Governance Powers in the Common-Law World, June 3, 2014
The Duty of Care as “Fiduciary Duty”, June 9, 2014
Delaware as “Market-Dominant Small Jurisdiction”, June 11, 2014
Washington and Lee law professor Christopher Bruner’s book, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power, was recently the subject of an online symposium. Styled a “book club,” the symposium was hosted by Prawfsblawg, a widely followed legal academic blog. Contributors included Matthew Bodie (Saint Louis University School of Law), John Cioffi (University of California, Riverside Department of Political Science), Andrew Gold (DePaul University College of Law), Joan Heminway (University of Tennessee College of Law), Brett McDonnell (University of Minnesota Law School), and Daniel Sokol (University of Florida Levin College of Law).
The contributors approached Professor Bruner’s work from a range of perspectives – including corporate law and governance, labor law, social welfare policy, political economy, and finance – but were uniform in their praise.
According to law professor Matthew Bodie, Professor Bruner’s book
… does a great service in expanding and deepening the debate over the nature of corporate governance. Employees have been pretty much left out of the corporate-governance models in legal academia, going back at least to Easterbrook and Fischel, and perhaps as far as Berle and Means…. By drawing a connection between corporate law and labor and employment law, Bruner has expanded the scope of “the law of the firm,” for lack of a better term, to include not just shareholders, boards, and top-level executives, but rather all the participants in the firm, especially employees.
John Cioffi, a political scientist, adds that Professor Bruner
… has made an important contribution not only to the literature on comparative corporate governance, but also to the broader field on comparative political economy…. Bruner powerfully explodes the analytical categories of the “common law countries” and “liberal market economies” by analyzing at length and in depth the substantial legal and political economic differences across these nations…. I am unaware of a comparably sustained and in-depth comparative treatment of corporate and economic governance in the common law countries that so clearly articulates the systemic significance of the differences across them.
Professor Bruner’s book, published in 2013 by Cambridge University Press, examines the corporate governance powers possessed by shareholders in the U.S. and other common-law countries. Bruner finds, contrary to popular belief, that shareholders in the U.K. and other common-law jurisdictions are both more powerful and more central to the aims of the corporation than are shareholders in the U.S. Bruner’s theory is that relatively robust social welfare protections in countries like the U.K., Australia and Canada have freed up their corporate legal systems to focus more intently on shareholder interests without giving rise to “political backlash” – because other legal structures accommodate the interests of employees.